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The social and ecological challenges that governments face have raised their interest in socially 
responsible business conduct (SRBC). In this article we analyze the motives of executives to 
perform SRBC. We distinguish three types of motives: financial, ethical and altruistic motives. 
We test the hypotheses on a sample of 473 executives. The estimation results show that SRBC is 
driven by a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic motives, but that the intrinsic motives are 
stronger than the extrinsic motive. 
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1.  Introduction  
 
Today the world faces a complex set of ecological and social issues that need to be resolved. 
Governmental institutions, located at both the national and international level, face serious and 
structural difficulties in addressing these issues. This has raised an interest in Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) for realizing public goals. Policy makers understand CSR as a concept 
whereby companies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and 
in their interactions with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis, beyond compliance to mandato-
ry, legal requirements (European Commission 2001). The concept reflects the idea that organiza-
tional behaviour is a potential key to the promotion of societal goals, including the achievement 
of governmental (national or international) strategies on sustainable development. 
Over the last quarter century, much research has been done to CSR, but little attention 
has been paid to understanding why or why not corporations act in socially responsible ways 
(Campbell, 2007). Often, it is assumed that executives are motivated by financial motives, be-
cause CSR has shown to raise the corporation’s profitability (Orlitzky et al. 2003; van Beurden 
and Gӧssling 2008 ). However, also intrinsic motives may drive CSR. Executives may derive 
private enjoyment from CSR, have altruistic concern over the well-being of others, or may perce-
ive CSR as a moral duty that they should observe.  
  In this paper, we investigate what motivational factors drive executives’ CSR. Answering 
this question is important for policy makers and societal groups (i.e. NGOs) that want to stimu-
late CSR. If extrinsic motives drive CSR, policy makers should implement institutional reforms 
that increase financial incentives. But if executives are motivated to CSR by intrinsic motives, 
policy makers should be careful by providing financial incentives, because extrinsic motives may 
crowd out intrinsic motives (Frey and Jegen 2001).  
In answering our research question, we develop an economic model to derive a set of hy-
potheses concerning the motives of SRBC.
1
In the following section, we present the economic model and the accompanying hypo-
theses. Next, we describe the sample and the measures we use. In section four we present the 
 Next, we test the hypotheses on a sample consisting 
of practicing executives. This methodology differs from many other studies in the field of re-
search into CSR (Agle and Van Buren 1999; Angelidis and Ibrahim 2004; Kennedy and Lawton 
1998) that use samples of MBA students. Research based on a sample consisting of executives 
will enhance the validity of research findings and increases the likelihood that it will receive se-
rious consideration by policy makers and practitioners (Loe, Ferrell and Mansfield 2000). The 
focus on executives is also motivated because of their level of autonomy (Hambrick and Mason 
1984; Werbel and Carter 2002).  
                                                 
1 Because our research focuses on the relationship between motives and social responsible business behaviour at the 
individual level, we use the term SRBC rather than CSR. Whereas SRBC can be applied to both the individual and 
organizational level, CSR refers mainly to the organizational instead of the individual level of behaviour (Bakker, 




estimation results and test the empirical validity of the hypotheses. In section five we interpret 
our findings by contrasting them with other recent research on motives that drive SRBC.  
 
2.  Theoretical model 
 
2.1.  Set up 
 
An executive faces the following maximization problem: 
 
(1)  max U = U (C ,S) 
 
Subject to the budget restriction: 
 
(2)  C = Y(S )
  
 
Equation (1) assumes that utility depends on consumption (C) and the level of SRBC (S). This 
second term expresses the intrinsic motive for SRBC, independent from financial benefits. We 
apply standard economic assumptions of concavity. Equation (2) assumes that all income is ex-
pended. Furthermore, the budget-restriction takes into account that SRBC may affect consump-
tion possibilities by raising or lowering income, due to, for example, reputation effects (see be-
low).  
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  Equations (1) and (2) are graphically illustrated by Figure 1. The vertical axis depicts 
consumption and the horizontal axis the level of SRBC. Curve 1 reflects the iso-utility curve. 
Curve 2 reflects the budget restriction. SRBC might (at least initially) have a positive impact on 
income
2
  Figure 1 illustrates one other interesting point, namely that executives that attach an in-
trinsic value to SRBC (i.e. ∂U/∂S>0), will always prefer a higher level of SRBC than executives 
that are only extrinsically motivated to SRBC as a strategic mean to raise income (i.e. ∂U/∂S=0). 
Executives that are merely strategically interested in SRBC will select SA, where the strategic 
value of SRBC for income is maximized. Their iso-utility curve is reflected by curve 3. Execu-
tives that also attach intrinsic value to SRBC will be prepared to trade off some income for at-
taining a higher level of SRBC and select SB. We therefore expect that executives that are intrin-
sically motivated to SRBC will be prepared to walk an additional mile and be more involved 
with SRBC. 
, because empirical research indicates that, on average, SRBC raises corporate financial 
performance (see below). Companies that invest in SRBC, for example by developing ethical 
codes and auditing processes, raise the transparency of their organization and reduce the proba-
bility of an incident that harms their reputation, which may confer a positive impact on their in-
come. However, it is very likely that the marginal returns of investing in SRBC decline. At some 
level of SRBC (point A in Figure 1), the marginal influence of SRBC on income becomes nega-
tive so that a trade-off occurs between SRBC and consumption. The optimal choice is given by 
point B, at the point of tangency between the iso-utility curve and the budget restriction. 
   
2.2.  Deriving the optimal level of SRBC 
 
In order to derive the optimal level of SRBC, we write the Lagrangian function for the maximi-
zation problem as: 
 
(3)   Max L (C, S) =  U (C, S) + λ {C - Y(S )}   
 
The first order conditions for an optimum level of SRBC are: 
 
(4)  ∂L/∂S = ∂U/∂S 
 - λ ∂Y/∂S = 0 
 
(5)  ∂L/∂C = ∂U/∂C + λ = 0 
 
Substitution of equation (5) into (4) yields: 
 
                                                 




(6)  ∂U/∂C ∂Y/∂S + ∂U/∂S   = 0 
 
The first term in equation (6) expresses the extrinsic motive for SRBC, because of its influence 
on income and consumption (the financial motive). The second term expresses the intrinsic mo-
tive for SRBC, independent from financial benefits.
3
  The total differentiation of (6) gives: 
  
 
(7)  g1∆S =∆(∂U/∂C ∂Y/∂S) + ∆∂U/∂S +  g2∆Y   
 
where∆x denotes an increase in x and: 
 
g1 = - {∂U/∂C ∂ 
2Y/∂S
2 + ∂Y/∂S (∂(∂U/∂C)/ ∂S) + ∂ 
2U/∂S
2} > 0  
g2 = ∂Y/∂S ∂ 
2U/∂C
2 ∂C/∂Y + ∂(∂Y/∂S)/∂Y   
 
The equation for g1 reflects the second order condition for maximal utility. Since all terms within 
brackets are negative, this condition is met. The equation for g2 reflects the influence of income. 
If we assume that reputation effects of SRBC are positively related to the income of executives, 
we can derive that income has a positive influence on SRBC. This follows from the combination 
of diminishing marginal utility from consumption (∂
2U/∂C
2 < 0) and the condition discussed in 
footnote 2 that the marginal impact of SRBC on income is non-positive in the optimal situation.  
 
2.3.  Hypotheses  
 
From equation (7) we derive four hypotheses (see Table 1).  
 
Table 1   Hypotheses 
H1  SRBC will be higher if an executive perceives SRBC to have a more positive effect on income and is more 
concerned with financial success 
H2  SRBC will be higher if the executive is more inclined to perceive SRBC as an ethical duty 
H3  SRBC will be higher if the executive is more altruistic 
H4  SRBC will be higher if the executive has a higher income 
 
The first hypothesis expresses the financial motive for SRBC. This motive depends on the inte-
raction of two factors: the perceived influence of SRBC on income (∂Y/∂S) and the relative im-
portance of income in the utility function of the executive (∂U/∂C). Executives attaching a high 
                                                 
3 Note that, since the intrinsic motive yields a non-negative marginal influence of SRBC on utility, equation (6) 
implies that the financial motive must yield a non-positive marginal effect of SRBC on income. If ∂
2Y/∂s
2 <0, this 
does not exclude the possibility that ∂Y/∂s may initially (and on average) be positive (as found in empirical literature 




value to financial success will be more actively involved with SRBC if they expect more finan-
cial benefits (or fewer costs) from SRBC. This positive effect of SRBC on income is a less im-
portant motive for executives who are less concerned about financial success. Many empirical 
studies find a positive relationship between SRBC and profitability (Orlitzky et al. 2003; Posni-
koff 1997; Waddock and Graves 1997) or shareholder value (Tudway and Pascal, 2006), al-
though some other studies find a neutral or negative relationship (Jones and Wicks, 1999; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2001). There are several ways in which SRBC can affect profitability. 
For example, it can improve the company’s reputation in the consumer market (Brown and Da-
cin 1997; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Miles and Covin 2000) and help companies to differen-
tiate themselves from their competitors with the aim of increasing sales and market share. In-
vestment in social initiatives can be as important as investment in advertising or R&D (Gardberg 
and Fombrun, 2006). Furthermore, a good reputation may also be rewarded by potential em-
ployees and the current workforce. An ethical work climate may lead to more trust in the compa-
ny, stronger commitment from employees, lower absenteeism and turnover rates, higher profita-
bility and productivity, and a more positive attitude to work and good conduct (Sims and Keon 
1997; Turban and Greening 1996). Furthermore, voluntary engagement in SRBC can potentially 
help business avoid regulation. For example, when attempting to enter new markets, companies 
with a good CSR reputation rarely face the same level of resistance as companies with poor CSR 
reputations (Lougee and Wallace, 2008). 
  The financial motive is an extrinsic motive of SRBC. It encourages SRBC because it has 
instrumental value for consumption. But SRBC may also be perceived as an end in itself, inde-
pendent from financial benefits. We refer to this as the ‘intrinsic motive’. A person may value 
and promote certain things that do not advance his personal well-being (Sen 1987). Hypothesis 2 
and 3 refer to this intrinsic motive to SRBC. We distinguish two types of intrinsic motives: 
SRBC as moral duty and SRBC as a form of altruism. The second hypothesis reflects the first 
type of intrinsic motives, i.e. the belief that SRBC is a moral duty. This moral duty can be de-
rived from ethical principles of moral philosophy, but also from religious principles. It is a sense 
of ethical, civic or religious duty (and feelings of guilt or shame if this duty is not met). That 
means that one feels obliged to do something because it is right, not because it is enjoyable (Et-
zioni 1988). These moral duties require an effort people might not undertake unless these acts are 
morally prescribed.  
  The other intrinsic motive is altruism. This is expressed by the third hypothesis. Execu-
tives may contribute to SRBC, not because they perceive it as an ethical duty, but because they 
enjoy helping others or want to contribute to the common good from a genuine concern of the 
well-being of others. The literature distinguishes between pure and impure altruism (Ribar and 
Wilhelm 2002). In the case of pure altruism, an executive values SRBC solely because of its 
positive societal consequences (Rabin 1998). In the case of impure altruism, executives also de-




  Both in the case of moral duty and altruism, the executive has internalized other-
regarding values as his/her own and turned them into preferences. In economic models, intrinsic 
motives are therefore often modeled by adding an argument to the utility function expressing 
intrinsic benefits from behaving in an altruistic manner or by living up to one’s moral duty (Et-
zioni 1988; Frey 1998; Rabin 1998).
4
  The fourth hypothesis concerns the influence of income on SRBC (already discussed 
above): if income increases, the marginal utility from consumption relative to the marginal utility 
of the intrinsic value of SRBC decreases and the reputation effect of SRBC increases. Hence, the 
executive will spend more resources on SRBC. 
 
 
3.  Data and Methodology 
 
3.1.  Sample 
 
To collect data in order to empirically test the hypotheses, we developed a questionnaire. The 
questionnaires were sent to executives of the three largest (non-sector specific) Dutch employers’ 
organizations. Of the 2,500 distributed questionnaires, 473 were completed and returned result-
ing in a response rate of 19 percent. Completing the questionnaire was completely voluntary. The 
average age of the executives in the sample was 49 years (s.d. = 9.2 years); 95 percent of the 
respondents were male. The respondents represented different types of industry; construction 
(12%), financial services (15%), manufacturing (15%), wholesale and retail trade (15%), health 
care (6%), and others (36%). Many respondents held very senior positions in their organization: 
38% were director-owner, 19% were CEOs and 43% held other senior positions. The religious 
affiliation of executives was protestant (61%), catholic (19%), non-religious (11%) and 9% reli-
gious in other terms other.  
We tested for non-response bias by comparing early and late respondents. As Armstrong 
and Overton (1977) argue, late respondents are representative of non-respondents. We found no 
significant difference between early and late respondents with respect to SRBC (p = .17). 
We collected our data using a single survey instrument and a single respondent per ques-
tionnaire. To address the potential concerns of common method bias and common source bias, 
we used several procedural remedies (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee and Podsakoff 2003). We pro-
tected respondents’ privacy by assuring them complete anonymity in our cover letter. We re-
duced item ambiguity by avoiding vague concepts, keeping the questions simple and pre-testing 
the survey with executives. Third, we separated scale items. By separating scale items for SRBC 
and motives for SRBC, we reduced the likelihood of respondents guessing the relationship be-
                                                 
4 Another way of including intrinsic motivations in economic models is to treat them as constraints within which the 
final choice must be made. As argued by White (2004), this is particular relevant for perfect duties (as defined in 
Kantian theory). SBRC as defined in this article concerns, however, mostly imperfect duties referring to ends that 




tween the dependent and the independent variables and consciously matching their responses to 
the different measures (Parkhe 1993). Moreover, we carried out Harman’s one-factor test. If a 
substantial amount of common method bias exists in data, a single or general factor that accounts 
for most of the variance will emerge if all the variables are entered together (Podsakoff et al. 
2003). An unrotated principal component analysis on all the variables in our analysis revealed 16 
factors with eigenvalues greater than 1.0, which together accounted for 71% of the total variance. 
The largest factor did not account for a majority of the variance (14 %).  
   
3.2.   SRBC 
  
We measured the self-perceived contribution to SRBC with a fourteen items containing scale, 
based on a scale developed by Graafland, Eijffinger and Smid (2004) and applied by Graafland 
and Van de Ven (2006) (see Appendix A). We asked the respondents how often they personally 
contribute more than required by law within their organization with respect to each of the differ-
ent items (1 = “never”, 5 = “always”).  
  A consideration to take into account when measuring SRBC regards for social desirability 
response bias (Treviño and Weaver 2003). In order to reduce the potential for this bias, we ex-
plained to the respondents in an accompanying letter that the questionnaire was confidential and 
to be used for research purposes only. The identity of the participants would remain anonymous. 
The executives who filled in the questionnaire thus had little reason to present a more favorable 
picture of themselves than they knew was the case. In a study on pro-environmental behavior 
(which is one aspect of SRBC), Kaiser, Wölfing, and Fuhrer (1999) showed that people are only 
marginally tempted to give socially desirable answers. Also other studies show that self-reported 
behavior and actual behavior are strongly correlated (see, e.g., Fuijii, Hennesy and Mak 1985; 
Warriner, McDougall and Claxton 1984; Bernard 2000; Gatersleben, Steg and Vlek 2002). A 
final reason to expect that a potential socially desirability response bias will not blur our analysis 
is that we found a high variance in the scores of the various components of SRBC. Even if the 
responses may reflect some socially desirability response bias, the bias is apparently not predo-
minant.  
 
3.3.  Motivational Variables 
 
The financial motive for SRBC depends on two intertwined factors: the perceived influence of 
SRBC on income and the relative importance of financial success in the utility function of the 
executive. Following Graafland and van de Ven (2006), the perceived influence of SRBC on 
income was measured by the following proposition: ‘Our firm’s efforts with respect to SRBC 
will have a positive influence on our financial results in the long term’. The relative importance 
of financial success was measured by attitudinal questions that are closely connected to the well-




financial, legal, ethical and philanthropic orientation towards CSR. We measured the four differ-
ent attitudes of the respondents by means of a scale developed by Aupperle, Carroll and Hatfield 
(1985) (see appendix B). A confirmatory factor analysis showed that the internal consistency of 
the factors is very satisfying (.80 for the financial orientation, .70 for the legal orientation, .65 for 
the ethical orientation, and .74 for the philanthropic orientation). Next, we multiplied the scores 
of the respondents on the financial orientation with the scores on the perceived influence of 
SRBC on income to create the interaction variable that reflects the financial motive.
5
 
 The ethical 
and philanthropic attitudes were taken as proxies for the ethical and altruistic motive of respon-
dents to contribute to SRBC.  
3.4.  Other Independent and Control Variables  
 
To measure income, we asked the respondents to categorize their gross annual income, using six 
categories. In order to prevent potential endogeneity of income with respect to SRBC, we used 
an instrumental variable. As instruments we used the age of the respondent, squared age, the 
function of the respondent and the number of subordinates. Furthermore, we controlled for sev-
eral other variables that might correlate with SRBC. Control variables used in the regression 
analysis are age, religiosity, gender, function, type of industry and size of the company. We dis-
tinguished between three types of functions: director-owner, CEO, and other functions, and five 
types of industries: manufacturing, construction, trade, financial services, and other sectors. For 
the size of the company, we used four dummies: very small companies (1-10 employees), small 
companies (11-50 employees), medium sized companies (51-100 employees) and large compa-
nies (more than 100 employees). For religiosity, we distinguished between protestant, catholic 
and other (non-religious) executives. 
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
 
In this section we present the findings of the empirical analysis.  
 
4.1.  Summary Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations for the variables included in the multivariate 
analysis. A correlation analysis showed significant correlations between the dependent variable 





                                                 
5 The scale of the interaction variable was set equal to the scale of the ethical and altruistic motives. 






  Mean  s.d.    Mean  s.d. 
SRBC  3.45  0.54  Gender  0.95  0.22 
Importance of financial success  2.72  1.10  Director Owner  0.42  0.50 
Strategic value of SRBC  3.89  0.71  CEO  0.19  0.39 
Ethical motive  3.50  0.95  Manufacturing  0.15  0.36 
Altruistic motive  1.73  0.88  Construction  0.12  0.33 
Income  2.68  0.69  Trade  0.15  0.35 
Age  49.26  9.24  Financial services  0.15  0.36 
Protestant  0.63  0.48  11-50 employees  0.21  0.41 
Catholic  0.19  0.39  51-100 employees  0.13  0.34 
Non-religious  0.11  0.32  > 100 employees  0.33  0.47 
 
 
4.2.  Estimation Results  
 
Table 3 reports the estimation results of the multivariate regression analysis. We used ordinary 
least squares regression analysis. The dependent variable, SRBC, is employed as a general con-
cept encompassing all fourteen items of the SRBC scale. 
The estimation results support all hypotheses. The financial, ethical and altruistic motives 
as well as income all lead to a higher level of SRBC (although income is not significant). Fur-
thermore, the combination of the intrinsic motives – the ethical and particularly the altruistic 
motive - appears more important than the financial motive. The total influence of the altruistic 
and ethical motives differs significantly from the influence of the strategic motive and is twice as 
large. Thus, SRBC seems more intrinsically driven than extrinsically driven.  
  For the control variables, we find that age has a significant, but small, positive influence 
on the contribution to SRBC, suggesting that older executives contribute more to SRBC com-
pared to younger executives. This finding has also been found by Valentine and Fleischman 
(2008). One explanation could be that an executive’s contribution to SRBC depends on his fami-
liarity with SRBC which may rise by learning by doing. An alternative explanation is that execu-
tives perceive that SRBC will contribute to their reputation. Then the age effect simply admini-
strates the wish of businessmen to be remembered as good businessmen when their career enters 
its last phase. With respect to the other control variables, protestant executives seem to be less 
involved with SRBC, although the effect is not very significant. This corresponds with recent 
research of Van den Belt and Moret (2010) who find that protestant managers within the Nether-
lands are less people orientated in their leadership than non-Christian and Roman Catholic man-
agers. We also find a negative effect of gender, male respondents being less inclined to contrib-
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2  0.22  0.22  0.18  0.19 
F  5.61  7.38  8.86  8.17 
Note - Unstandardized coefficients are shown, with t-values listed in parentheses. Religion, gender, function, sector and size are 
measured by dummy variables. 
 
Furthermore, we find that the function of the executive has a significant influence on 
SRBC. The estimation results show that CEOs are more actively involved with SRBC than direc-
tor owners and other senior managers. This seems to provide ground to one of Friedman’s well 




ers, customers or employees when they are actively pursuing a CSR policy (Friedman 1970). Our 
results seem indeed to indicate that it is more attractive for CEOs to take social responsibility for 
the general social interest with the money of others than for director owners who are spending 
their own money or time when they actively pursue a CSR policy.  For the industries, we find 
that executives in the manufacturing industry contribute more to SRBC than executives in other 
sectors. Finally, the estimation results show that small companies are more actively pursuing a 
policy of CSR than larger companies. Lindgreen, Swaen and Johnston (2009) also conclude that 
organization size appears to play a role in the development of specific CSR practices. According 
to those authors, small organizations invest more in customer, supplier and employee related 
CSR practices, and less in environmental practices than do larger organizations.  
  In the second column, we dropped all variables which were found to be highly insignifi-
cant (T-values lower than 1). The F test rises accordingly and income now becomes significant. 
But the parameters of gender, director owner, trade and financial services remain insignificant. In 
the third column we therefore dropped these control variables as well. This equation provides the 
starting point for a more disaggregated analysis for subgroups of the sample. 
  In the fourth column we disentangled the two variables that underlie the financial motive 
and estimated the separate influence of each. Both variables have a positive relationship with 
SRBC. However, the F test shows that separating both influences does not add to the explanatory 
power. We therefore maintain the integrated specification of the financial motive, as it is more in 
line with our theoretical model. 
 
4.3.  Estimation Results for Sub Samples 
 
Although Table 3 gives insight into the influence of control variables, it merely tests the additive 
influence of age, religiosity, gender, function and sector. However, the influence of these control 
variables may go beyond and also affect the parameters of the four hypotheses of our model. In 
order to test for these interaction effects, we also perform a disaggregate regression analysis for 
sub samples of our sample. In each case, we used the estimation results reported in the third col-
umn of Table 3 as a starting point and re-estimated this equation for the relevant sub sample. 
  Table 4 reports the outcomes for differentiation to age and gender.
7
 
 The second row re-
ports the average SRBC level for each sub group. As expected from Table 3, SRBC rises with 
age as well as with female gender.  
                                                 
7 We also included the control variables reported in the third column of Table 3 (while, of course, leaving out the 
control variable that was tested at a disaggregate level), but for presentational purpose we do not report the estima-











N = 68 
40 – 49 
N = 149 
50 - 59 
N = 158 
> 60 
N = 58 
Male 
N = 413 
Female 
N = 22 































































Note - Unstandardized coefficients are shown, with t-values listed in parentheses. 
 
Table 4 shows that the finding that intrinsic motives to SRBC outperform extrinsic motives hold 
for all age groups, but in particular for the younger executives. Further, note that income seems 
particular an important driver for young executives, but less so for older executives. Also disag-
gregating to gender does not change the result that intrinsic motives stimulate SRBC more than 
extrinsic motives: both for male and female executives the total effect of the ethical and altruistic 
motives exceeds the influence of the financial motive.  
  Table 5 reports the estimation results for various religious groups. As expected, the aver-
age SRBC is lowest for protestant executives, whereas Roman Catholic and non-religious execu-
tives are more or less equally involved with SRBC. 
 
Table 5 






N = 89 
Protestant 
N = 259 
Non religious 
N = 51 







































Note - Unstandardized coefficients are shown, with t-values listed in parentheses. 
 
Disaggregation to denomination of religious belief gives more differentiation. In particular, Ta-
ble 5 shows that for Roman Catholic and non-religious executives the ethical motive shows no 
impact whatsoever. Protestant executives SRBC seems more sensitive for the ethical motive. For 
Protestant and non-religious executives, the altruistic motive has the highest influence on SRBC. 
In contrast, for Roman Catholic executives the financial motive has the highest influence on 




  Table 6 shows the disaggregate estimation results for different functions of executives. 
As expected, the SRBC is highest for CEOs. 
 
Table 6 
Disaggregation to Function 
Variables 
 
Aggregate  Director Owner 
N = 182 
CEO 
N = 83 
Other Senior Management 
N = 169 







































Note - Unstandardized coefficients are shown, with t-values listed in parentheses. 
 
Table 6 shows that the ethical motive significantly affects SRBC involvement of director owners, 
but not that of CEOs. This might indicate that director owners with a high ethical motivation feel 
personally responsible for a high SRBC involvement of their company, because their own name 
is directly linked to that of the company. In contrast, CEOs and also higher management are 
more sensitive to the altruistic motive. For all functions, the sum of the ethical and altruistic mo-
tives proves to have a larger influence on SRBC than the financial motive. Furthermore, it is 
remarkable that the financial motive only significantly affects the SRBC of director owners. This 
might be due to the close link between organizational performance and personal income that is 
quite common for director owners. As suggested before, for CEO’s and other senior managers it 
seems to be less important that SRBC pays back in the long term compared to director owners, 
the latter investing in SRBC with their own money and time.  
  Table 7 reports the estimation results for different sectors. As expected from Table 3, 
executives in the financial service sector lack behind the executives in other sectors who more or 
less equally contribute to SRBC.  
   
Table 7 






N = 67 
Construction 
N = 51 
Trade 
N = 62 
Financial 
N = 65 
Other 
N = 178 















































(2.14)  (3.49)  (0.44)  (-0.36)  (0.49)  (2.01) 
Note - Unstandardized coefficients are shown, with t-values listed in parentheses. 
 
With respect to the relevance of various motives we find some differences among sectors. In 
particular, in contrast to other executives, SRBC by executives in the construction sector is not at 
all driven by the ethical motive. Furthermore, we find that for all sectors but the construction 
industry, the intrinsic motives prove to be more important for SRBC than the financial motive. 
  Table 8 presents the disaggregation to companies of different size.  
 
Table 8 
Disaggregation to Company Size 
Variables 
 
Aggregate  <= 10 
N = 131 
11 - 50  
N = 97 
51 - 100 
N = 59 
> 100 
N = 148 
SRBC 















































Note - Unstandardized coefficients are shown, with t-values listed in parentheses. 
 
In all cases, the sum of the parameters of the ethical and altruistic motive exceeds the parameter 
of the financial motive, but the difference is particular significant for executives of companies 
with 11-100 employees. For the small (10 employees or less) and large companies (over 100 
employees) the difference between the impact of intrinsic and extrinsic motives appears negligi-
ble. 
 
5.  Comparison with Other Research 
 
The aggregated and disaggregated regression analysis in section IV shows that the finding that 
intrinsic motives provide stronger stimulus than extrinsic motives to SRBC is highly robust. This 
result is in line with the theoretical model developed in section II. In this section, we compare 
these results with other studies that have investigated motives of SRBC. 
  First, we compare our results with a study of Graafland and van de Ven (2006) on a sam-
ple of 110 Dutch companies, of which 48 large companies (over 100 employees) and 62 small 
companies. In this paper, the extrinsic motive of CSR is measured on a 5 points Likert scale 
based on the response to the proposition: ‘Our firm’s efforts with respect to CSR will have a 
positive influence on our financial results in the long term’. The intrinsic motive is measured 




of businesses towards society.’ Graafland and van den Ven correlate the responses to these prop-
ositions with an aggregate of 31 concrete CSR aspects. They find that CSR is significantly re-
lated to the intrinsic motive, but no significant relation is detected between CSR and the extrinsic 
motive. After disaggregation into five stakeholder related CSR dimensions (employees, custom-
ers, suppliers, competitors and society) and the use of CSR related instruments (code of conduct, 
ISO certification, ethics confidant, ethics committee, ethical training, social reporting), they find 
that the strategic motive does influence employees and customer related aspects of CSR, but 
none of the other CSR dimensions. This might indicate a perception among companies that the 
win-win perspective is most relevant for CSR aspects of employee and customer relations. Cor-
relations for each of the thirty-one CSR aspects show that quality control of products and a com-
plaints procedure for customers in particular, may be motivated strategically.  
  Second, Galaskiewicz and Colman (2006) have researched the motives for corporate phi-
lanthropy. They found that the respondents genuinely believed that business has a duty to im-
prove local communities and create a better world for the future. This intrinsic motive appeared 
to be more important than the furthering of personal interests or the interests of the company. It 
should be noted, however, that corporate philanthropy is not representative for the full range of 
SRBC related activities. This may bias their results in favor of intrinsic motives. 
  Other researchers have found more mixed results. Brønn and Vidaver-Cohen (2009) re-
search 1644 Norwegian companies. Their sample only includes firms with over 50 employees. 
They asked managers what they see as the primary reasons for their company’s engagement in 
activities that benefit society from a list of sixteen motives. They find that the company’s long-
term interest and image feature among the most frequently three reasons. However, intrinsic mo-
tives are also often ranked high, such as be recognized for moral leadership (second rank) and 
personal satisfaction (fourth rank). Furthermore, in some cases (fulfill stakeholder expectations, 
ranked fifth) it is unclear whether the motive is intrinsic or extrinsic. Finally, there are many oth-
er extrinsic motives that rank very low, such as creating financial opportunities (rank 12), meet 
shareholder demands (rank 14) or avoid regulation (15). On average, one can conclude that both 
extrinsic and intrinsic reasons play a role, with a slight predominance of extrinsic reasons.  
  Lougee and Wallace (2008) indicate that companies use CSR mainly as a form of “risk 
management”. They researched two samples of companies, the S&P 500 and Domini 400, and 
used KLD data of quantitative measures of CSR for a period of 15 years. These data identify 
both strengths (strong CSR performance) and concerns (weak CSR performance) for each com-
pany. In order to disentangle the influence of intrinsic and extrinsic motivations, they make an 
important  assumption, namely that companies that are intrinsically motivated to CSR are more 
likely to make investments in both increasing their CSR strengths and in decreasing their CSR 
concerns. In contrast, companies that approach CSR from a strategic point of view, would only 
be concerned with maximizing the profit from their CSR investment. According to Lougee and 
Wallace, this suggest placing a priority on building CSR strengths while subordinating efforts to 




that both for the S&P 500 firms and the Domini 400 firms the CSR strengths are positively re-
lated to the CSR concerns, suggesting that most companies are extrinsically motivated. 
  How do these results compare to our own results that intrinsic motives have a larger im-
pact on CSR than extrinsic motives? First, we note that Brønn and Vidaver-Cohen do not re-
search the relationship between these motives and the SRBC performance of companies. Hence, 
this research does not provide insight into the effects that these motives have on SRBC. Actually, 
as shown in Table 2, the executives in our sample on average also attach a higher value to the 
strategic attitude (3.89) than to the ethical attitude (3.50) or altruistic attitude (1.57). But this 
does not say anything about what drives SRBC in practice.  Another potential explanation for the 
different findings might be the difference between samples. Whereas our research focused on 
individual persons in companies and included many small companies, Brønn and Vidaver-Cohen 
(2009) and Lougee and Wallace (2008) only used data of large public companies. As is shown in 
Table 8, we also find no evidence that intrinsic motives have more influence on SRBC than ex-
trinsic motives for large companies. Only for companies with 10-100 employees a significant 
difference between intrinsic and extrinsic motives is found.  
   
6.  Conclusion  
 
In this paper we develop an economic model to analyze the motives of SRBC and test the model 
on data of executives in the Netherlands. Based on the model, we develop four hypotheses: 
SRBC will be higher if an executive perceives SRBC to have a more positive effect on income 
and is more concerned with financial success; SRBC will be higher if the executive is more in-
clined to perceive SRBC as an ethical duty; SRBC will be higher if the executive is more altruis-
tic; SRBC will be higher if the executive has a higher income. Another implication of the model 
is that executives that are intrinsically motivated for ethical or altruistic reasons, will be more 
inclined to contribute to SRBC than companies that are merely financially motivated to SRBC. 
The latter type of companies will only select SRBC policies of which the benefits exceed the 
costs. In contrast, companies that are also intrinsically motivated will be prepared to go beyond 
this limit and add SRBC options that, although not financially rewarding for the company, are 
highly valuable from a social point of view.   
  Using a sample of 473 executives of Dutch companies, we find that all hypotheses are 
confirmed. The results showed that SRBC in general has a positive relationship with financial, 
ethical, and altruistic motives and with income. Furthermore, we find that SRBC is indeed more 
driven by intrinsic (altruistic and ethical) motives than by the extrinsic (financial) motives. Test 
results on subsamples confirm that this finding is highly robust. 
  Our findings indicate that governments should be careful with providing financial incen-
tives to stimulate SRBC. In the economic literature it is well known that extrinsic motives may 
crowd out intrinsic motives (Bowles 1988; Frey and Oberholzer 1997; Frey 1998; Frey and Je-




truistically or by living up to civic duties, paying for this service might diminish this type of con-
duct. Policy makers and NGOs therefore better focus on the moral commitment to SRBC, for 
example by stimulating the public debate about the responsibilities of companies that reinforce 
the intrinsic motive of executives to SRBC. 
 
Appendix A.  Measurement of SRBC 
 
Table A1 reports the items, means and standard deviations of aspects of SRBC that are covered. 
 
Table A1 
Elements of SRBC 
  mean   SD 
Employee safety  3.79  0.93 
Employee training  3.77  0.77 
Prevent abuses  3.91  0.87 
Respectful relationship with suppliers  4.06  0.86 
Respectful relationship with customers  4.44  0.69 
Respectful relationship with competitors  3.79  0.86 
Offering equal opportunities to immigrants  2.90  1.15 
Offering equal opportunities to women  3.42  1.15 
Increasing employee attention to environment   3.30  0.95 
Reducing pollution within the business chain  3.19  1.06 
Reducing pollution of the own company  3.39  1.00 
Reintegration of disabled  2.52  1.03 
Financial support of local projects  3.16  0.94 
Financial support of third world projects   2.69  1.11 
 
 
Appendix B.  Measurement of SRBC Orientation 
 
Table B1 reports the questions, means and standard deviations of the scale that we used for mea-
suring the SRBC orientation. The respondents are asked to allocate up to, but not more than, 10 
points to each set of four statements (1 represents the least degree of importance). In the ques-
tionnaire, we gave two examples how respondents might allocate points to a set of statements as 
follows (e.g. A = 2, B = 4, C = 1, D = 3, Total = 10 or A = 2, B = 1, C = 0, D = 7, Total = 10). 
 
Table B1 
Measurement of CSR Orientation 
    mean  S.d. 
1  It is important to perform in a manner consistent with:     
  A. expectations of maximizing earnings per share.  2.88  1.70 
  B. expectations of government and the law.  2.01  1.14 
  C. the philanthropic and charitable expectations of society  1.79  1.17 
  D. expectations of societal mores and ethical norms.  3.32  1.48 
2  It is important to monitor new opportunities that can enhance the organization’s:     
  A. moral and ethical image in society.  2.75  1.11 
  B. compliance with local, state, and federal statutes.  1.99  1.00 
  C. financial health.  3.46  1.29 




3  It is important that good corporate citizenship be defined as:     
  A. doing what the law expects.  1.78  1.20 
  B. providing voluntary assistance to charities and community 
 organizations. 
2.09  1.41 
  C. doing what is expected morally and ethically.  4.34  1.82 
  D. being as profitable as possible.  1.80  1.45 
4  It is important to be committed to:     
  A. being as profitable as possible.  2.18  1.54 
  B. voluntary and charitable activities.  1.30  1.06 
  C. abiding by laws and regulations.  2.54  1.24 
  D. moral and ethical behavior.  3.98  1.58 
5  It is important to:     
  A. assist voluntarily those projects that enhance a community’s quality of life.  1.66  1.23 
  B. provide goods and services that at least meet minimal legal 
 requirements. 
1.94  1.07 
  C. avoid compromising societal norms and ethics to achieve goals.  3.10  1.25 
  D. allocate organizational resources as efficiently as possible.  3.30  1.35 
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